Florida
Dispute Resolution Center
THE RESOLUTION REPORT ONLINE
April 2006 - Volume 22, Number 2
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U.S.
Supreme Court Asserts Ascendancy of Federal Arbitration Act over
State Law
By
Richard Cox
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United States Supreme Court, in Buckeye Check Cashing v. Cardegna,
decided February 21, 2006, was confronted with the issue of whether
an arbitration provision contained in a contract which is void under
state (Florida) law can be separately enforced while there is a
claim pending in a state court that the contract containing the
arbitration provision is itself illegal and void ab initio. The
Florida Supreme Court had answered the question by holding that
jurisdiction to determine the illegality of the contract rested
with the state court. Cardegna v. Buckeye Check Cashing, 894 So.2d
860 (Fla. 2005).
The United States Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice
Scalia, reversed and remanded, holding that regardless of whether
it is brought in federal or state court, a challenge to the validity
of a contract as a whole, and not specifically to the arbitration
clause within it, must go to the arbitrator, not the court. This
conclusion was based on three propositions. First, as a matter
of substantive federal arbitration law, an arbitration provision
is severable from the remainder of the contract. Second, unless
the challenge is to the arbitration clause itself, the issue of
the contract’s validity is considered by the arbitrator
in the first instance. Third, the Federal arbitration law applies
in state as well as federal courts.
The Court observed that a claim that the agreement as a whole
(including its arbitration provision) is rendered invalid by the
usurious finance charge fails because this challenges the agreement,
and not specifically its arbitration provisions, and the latter
are enforceable apart from the remainder of the contract. Thus,
the challenge should be considered by an arbitrator, not a court.
The Court rejected an argument that the Federal Arbitration
Act applies only to valid contracts, reasoning as follows:
We do not read ‘contract’ so narrowly. The word appears
four times in §2 [of the Federal Arbitration Act]. Its last
appearance is in the final clause, which allows a challenge to
an arbitration provision ‘upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of a contract.’ (Emphasis
added). There can be no doubt that ‘contract’ as used
this last time must include contracts that later prove to be void.
Otherwise, the grounds for revocation would be limited to those
that rendered a contract voidable—which would mean (implausibly)
that an arbitration agreement could be challenged as voidable
but not as void. Because the sentence’s final use of ‘contract’
so obviously includes putative contracts, we will not read the
same word earlier in the same sentence to have a more narrow meaning.
Justice Thomas dissented, opining
that in state-court proceedings, the Federal Arbitration Act cannot
be the basis for displacing a state law that prohibits enforcement
of an arbitration clause contained in a contract that is unenforceable
under state law. Justice Alito did not participate in the decision.
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